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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-3126 
___________ 
 
SARAH FREEMAN, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
STEVEN HARRIS; SCOTT JANORA;  
STATE OF NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.N.J. Civil Action No. 3-16-cv-02327) 
District Judge:  Brian R. Martinotti 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 22, 2018 
 
Before: VANASKIE, COWEN and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 23, 2018) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
 Plaintiff Sarah Freeman, proceeding pro se, appeals the District Court’s dismissal 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
  
2 
 
of her complaint with prejudice.  Freeman alleges race discrimination under Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.  For the reasons that follow, we 
will affirm the District Court’s decision. 
 Freeman is an African-American woman who is employed by the State of New 
Jersey Department of the Treasury.  She took a civil service exam in 2007 and received 
the second-highest score on a promotional list of eligible employees.  In 2008 and 2011, 
Freeman’s employer filled several positions with eligible employees from the list; she 
was not promoted.1 
 On January 3, 2015, Freeman filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) based on her employer’s 2008 and 
2011 employment decisions.  The EEOC issued Freeman a dismissal and right to sue 
notice on January 26, 2016.  Freeman filed a complaint in April 2016 in the District Court 
against her employer, as well as Steven Harris, who she labels an “Administrator,” and 
Scott Janora, a “Supervisor.”  The District Court dismissed her complaint with prejudice 
on defendants’ motion.  It determined that Freeman could not sue the individual 
defendants under Title VII and that she could not pursue her remaining claim against her 
employer because she had not exhausted her administrative remedies.  Freeman timely 
                                              
1  The factual allegations in Freeman’s complaint consist entirely of the following 
statements: “I passed the Civil Service Exam ranking #2 and everyone on the list received 
the promotion except for me.  He promoted someone (Judy Falchek) provisional while 
there was a[n] existing list.  When I met with Mr[.] Harris to ask why I’m not being 
considered he said he’s not interested in promoting me.”  See Supp. App’x at 14.   
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appealed. 
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss.  See 
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 2009). 
The District Court correctly concluded that Freeman cannot pursue claims against 
Harris or Janora individually because “Congress did not intend to hold individual 
employees liable under Title VII.”  See Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 
F.3d 1061, 1078 (3d Cir. 1996). 
The District Court also correctly dismissed her Title VII claims against her 
employer based on her failure to timely exhaust her administrative remedies.  A Title VII 
plaintiff must exhaust her administrative remedies by complying with the procedural 
requirements set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 before filing a federal complaint.  As 
relevant here, a plaintiff must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 180 
days of the alleged unlawful employment practice, or within 300 days after the alleged 
unlawful employment practice if the plaintiff initially instituted proceedings with a state 
or local agency.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).  These time periods “are treated as 
statutes of limitations.”  See Burgh v. Borough Council of Borough of Montrose, 251 
F.3d 465, 470 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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Under either deadline,2 Freeman’s 2015 EEOC complaint was untimely filed 
several years after her employer’s 2008 and 2011 promotion decisions.3  Freeman has not 
argued that she is entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations in this case and 
we can see no basis for it.  See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 
(1982) (“[A] timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional 
prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is 
subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.”); Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018, 
1022 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[E]quitable tolling of statutes of limitation may be appropriate: (1) 
where the defendant has actively misled the plaintiff respecting the plaintiff’s cause of 
action; (2) where the plaintiff in some extraordinary way has been prevented from 
asserting his or her rights; or (3) where the plaintiff has timely asserted his or her rights 
mistakenly in the wrong forum.”) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
Finally, even if Freeman had properly exhausted her administrative remedies, she 
                                              
2  Freeman filed a complaint with the New Jersey Division on Civil Rights in 2012 based 
on her present allegations. 
 
3  Freeman argues in her appellate documents that the promotional list resulting from the 
2007 civil service exam was still active when she filed her federal complaint, making her 
EEOC charge timely.  See Appellant’s Br. at ECF p. 5, 91.  Even if we could consider 
these allegations, which do not appear in her complaint, Freeman does not explain the 
relevance of this list to the timeliness of her filing, as she does not allege that her 
employer took any adverse employment action against her after 2011.  See McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
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has provided no factual allegations to support her race discrimination claim.4  At no point 
in the District Court or on appeal has Freeman explained why she believes her 
employer’s 2008 or 2011 decisions occurred under circumstances that give rise to an 
inference of unlawful discrimination, as she must to state a prima facie case.  See Texas 
Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981); McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).  The District Court properly dismissed her 
complaint with prejudice, as amendment would be futile under these circumstances.  See 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 
                                              
4  Freeman checked off a box on her form complaint indicating that her employer had 
retaliated against her.  See Supp. App’x at 13.  However, she has never made any factual 
allegations to support a retaliation claim.  Further, she does not appear to have raised a 
retaliation claim when she filed her EEOC charge and the District Court did not discuss 
it.  As Freeman has not actually alleged retaliation, we have not addressed such a claim. 
